Baquedano C., Fabar C. (2017)

Modeling Subjects’ Experience While Modeling the Experimental Design: A Mild-Neurophenomenology-Inspired Approach in the Piloting Phase. Constructivist Foundations 12 (2): 166-180.

Bitbol M., Petitmengin C. (2017)

Neurophenomenology and the micro-phenomenological interview. in: S. Schneider & M. Velmans (ed.).

The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (2nd edition). Wiley & Sons.

Bitbol M., Petitmengin C. (2016)

On the possibility and reality of introspection. Mind and Matter 14 (1): 51-75

Bitbol M., Petitmengin C. (2015)

The science of mind as it could have been: About the contingency of the (quasi-)disappearance of introspection in psychology. In: Soler L., Trizio E., Pickering A. (eds).

Science as it could have been. University of Pittsburg Press.

Bitbol M. (2014)

La conscience a-t-elle une origine ? Paris : Flammarion.

 

Bitbol M., Petitmengin C. (2013)

On the possibility and reality of introspection. Kairos 6: 173-198. 

 

Bitbol M., Petitmengin C. (2013)

A defense of Introspection from Within. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3): 269-279

Bitbol M., Petitmengin C. (2011)

On pure reflection – A reply to Zahavi. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):24-37

 

Bitbol M. (2006)

Une science de la conscience équitable: L’actualité de la neurophénoménologie de Francisco Varela. Intellectica 43: 135–157

 

Depraz N., Desmidt. T. (2018)

Cardiophenomenology: a refinement of Neuro-phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (Published Online).

Depraz N., Vermersch P., Varela F. (2011)

A l'épreuve de l'expérience : pour une pratique phénoménologique. Zeta Books.

Depraz N., Vermersch P., Varela F. (2003)

On Becoming Aware. A pragmatics of experiencing. John Benjamins Publishing Company

 

Froese, T. Gould, C. , Seth, A.K. (2011)

Validating and Calibrating First- and Second-person Methods in the Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2): 40-64.

 

Hendricks M. (2009)

Experiencing Level:  An instance of developing a variable from a first person process so it can be reliably measured and taught. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12): 129-155.

 

Jack A. (2013)

Introspection: the tipping point. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2): 670-1

 

Lachaux J.P. (2011)

If no control, then what? Making sense of "neural noise" in human brain mapping experiments using first-person reports. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2): 162–166.

 

Lutz A. (2002)

Toward a Neurophenomenology of generative passages: a first empirical case study. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 133-167.

Petitmengin C., Remillieux A., Valenzuela-Moguillansky C. (2018)

Discovering the structures of lived experience. Towards a micro-phenomenological analysis method. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (4) 691-730. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9597-4

Petitmengin C. (2017)

Enaction as a lived experience. Towards a radical neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 12 (2): 139-147.

Petitmengin C., Bitbol M., Olagnier-Beldame M. (2015)

Vers une science de l'expérience vécue. Intellectica 64: 53-76

 

Petitmengin C. & Lachaux J.P. (2014)

Les sciences microcognitives : un pont entre les dynamiques expérientielle et neuronale. In: Natalie Depraz (ed). Première, deuxième, troisième personne. Zeta Books. 

 

Petitmengin, C. (2014)

Comment on Vermersch's 'Explicitation et Phénoménologie'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (11-12): 196-201.

 

Petitmengin, C. & Lachaux, J.P. (2013)

Microcognitive Sciences: bridging experiential and neuronal microdynamics. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:617. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00617.

 

Petitmengin C., Remillieux A., Cahour B., Carter-Thomas S. (2013)

A gap in Nisbett and Wilson’s findings? A first-person access to our cognitive processes. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2): 654–669.

Petitmengin C. (2011).

Is the “Core Sef” a Construct?. Constructivist Foundations 8/2: 270-274.

Petitmengin C. (2011)

Describing the experience of describing? Comments on Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel's'Descrining inner Experience?'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1): 44-62.

 

Petitmengin, C. (Ed). (2011)

Ten Years' Viewing from Within: Further Debate. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2).

Petitmengin C., Bitbol M. (2011)

Let's trust the (skilled) subject! – Reply to Froese, Gould and Seth. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2): 90-97.

 

Petitmengin C., Bitbol M. (2011)

Coming into contact with experience - Reply to Butler. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2): 146-149.

 

Petitmengin C. (2010)

La dynamique pré-réfléchie de l'expérience vécue. Alter - Revue de Phénoménologie 18: 165-182.

 

Petitmengin C. (Ed). (2009)

Ten Years of Viewing from Within. London: Imprint Academic. 

 

Petitmengin, C. (Ed). (2009)

Ten Years of Viewing from Within. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16 (10-12). 

 

Petitmengin C. (2009)

Editorial Introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12): 7-19.

 

Petitmengin C., Bitbol M. (2009)

The Validity of First-Person Descriptions as Authenticity and Coherence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12): 363-404.

 

Petitmengin C. (2006)

Describing one's Subjective Experience in the Second Person. An Interview Method for the Science of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5: 229-269.

French version: Décrire son expérience subjective en première personne. Une méthode d'entretien pour une science de la conscience.

Sparby T., Edelhäuser F., Weger U. (2020)

The sense of certainty and the reliability of first person reports: An investigation using micro-phenomenological self‐inquiry. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 61 (6): 775-783. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjop.12671

 

Valenzuela-Moguillansky C., Vásquez-Rosati A. (2019)

An Analysis Procedure for the Micro-phenomenological Interview. Constructivist Foundations 14 (2): 123-145.

 
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C., Vásquez-Rosati A., Riegler A. (2017)

Building a Science of Experience: Neurophenomenology and Related Disciplines. Constructivist Foundations 12 (2): 131:137.

Varela F. (1996)

Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 330-35

 

Varela F. J. and Shear J. (ed) (1999)

The View from Within. First-person Approaches to the Study of Consciousness. London: Imprint Academic.

 

Varela F.J. & Shear J. (1999)

First-person methodologies: What, Why, How?. In F.J. Varela F.J. & Shear J. (ed)

The View from Within. First-person approaches to the study of consciousness. London: Imprint Academic. 1–14.

 

Vermersch P. (2013)

Explicitation et Phénoménologie. Paris: PUF.

 

Vermersch P. (2009)

Describing the practice of introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10–12): 20-57.

 

Vermersch, P. (2006)

Rétention, passivité, visée à vide, intention éveillante. Phénoménologie et pratique de l’explicitation. Expliciter 65: 14–28.

 

Vermersch, P. (2004)

Modèle de la mémoire chez Husserl. 2/ La rétention, Expliciter 54: 22–28.

 

Vermersch, P. (2004)

Modèle de la mémoire chez Husserl. 1/ Pourquoi Husserl s’intéresse-t-il tant au ressouvenir. Expliciter 53: 1–14.

 

Vermersch P. (2000)

Conscience directe et conscience réfléchie. Intellectica 31: 269-311.

 

Vermersch, P. (1999)

Introspection as practice. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3): 17-42.

 

Vermersch P. & Maurel M. (1997)

Pratiques de l’entretien d’explicitation. Paris: ESF.

 

Vermersch P. (1994/2017)

L'entretien d'explicitation. Paris: ESF.

Vermersch P. (2018)

The explicitation interview, English translation of L'entretien d'explicitation (1994)

Vion-Dury J.,  Balzani C., Micoulaud-Franchi J-A., Naudin J. (2013)

L’horizon de la phénoménologie expérientielle : les formes incandescentes de la présence humaine. Alter 21: 337-351.

Vion-Dury J. (Ed). (2018).

Special issue: Fondamentaux de l'explicitation des vécus conscients. Chroniques Phénoménologiques n° 11.